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Abstract 
The main aim of the current paper is to investigate the productivity dynamics of Turkish economy 
between 2003-2015, during the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) era, to contribute to the ongoing 
discussions of long-term economic growth of the country, using a unique data set and firm-level 
granular productivity analysis. Furthermore, the political economy of the deindustrialization of 
Turkey is scrutinized as a complement to the productivity analysis. Among a plethora of results, 
the following three are the most important ones in terms of their policy implications: (i) The 
aggregate productivity figures underestimate the productivity improvements in the manufacturing 
sector and overestimate the productivity losses in the services sector. (ii) The productivity growth 
of manufacturing sector in Turkey has been positive yet evolving towards medium-low tech 
manufacturing which displays the lowest productivity growth among all manufacturing sectors. 
(iii) While the surviving firms in the Turkish manufacturing sector have increased their own 
productivity in the AKP era, in the services sector surviving firms had a negative contribution to 
aggregate productivity growth. 
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1. Introduction 
The first two decades of the new millennium are laden with profound economic 
and political changes in Turkey. In the context of its modern history, the country 
has experienced one of its deepest economic crises in February 2001, which proved 
to be elemental in the subsequent rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP, 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) to power in November 2002 and the demise of the 
highly fragmented and short-living coalition governments of the 1990s.   
Regardless of the debate on the causes of the 2001-crisis, in its immediate 
aftermath the Turkish economy has undergone important economic reforms and 
rapid institutional improvements under the tutelage of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), which was also involved in the macro-management of the 
economy through an orthodox IMF program that imposed fiscal austerity and a 
contractionary monetary policy (Akyüz and Boratav, 2003; Cizre and Yeldan, 
2005; Van Rijckeghem and Üçer, 2005; Bakır and Öniş, 2010).  
The AKP was successful in capitalizing upon these economic reforms in its first 
years; indeed, the annual economic growth in the 2003-2006 reached 7.8 percent, 
the highest since 1950s. Among other factors, the AKP owed this success mainly 
to its commitment to the goal of EU membership, since the EU was considered to 
be an external anchor for the implementation of a series of economic, political and 
institutional reforms (Öniş, 2012). Furthermore, these years also coincided with 
an abundant global liquidity environment that allowed Turkey to attract sizeable 
short-term foreign capital (Acemoğlu and Üçer, 2015).       
Since then, the AKP continued its success in the ballot box; however, it was not 
able to reside over an inclusive and sustainable economic achievement. The years 
between 2008-2010 was the period of a global recession that was erupted in the 
US and became an epidemic around the globe. Even though the AKP has 
effectively managed the public perception about the crisis, the annual GDP growth 
has declined to 1.4 percent in the period of 2008-2010 but then rebounded to 7.1 
percent in the 2011-2015 period (as a result of the basis effect).  
Despite all this growth success, Turkey has not significantly changed its 
specialization in low-medium technologies and low labor cost production in the 
2003-2015 period. Considering that one of the most important long-run economic 
objectives of a country is to achieve sustainable high growth rates, it is obvious 
that Turkey is in need of catching up in terms of technological sophistication and 
sustained productivity growth (Acemoğlu, 2008 and references therein).  
In the light of these motives, the main aim of the current paper is to investigate 
the productivity dynamics of Turkey during the AKP era to contribute to the 
ongoing discussions of long-term economic growth of the country, using a unique 
data set and firm-level granular productivity analysis. 
The data used in this paper originate from the Annual Industry and Services 
Statistics and the Foreign Trade Statistics Databases of Turkey. The Annual 
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Industry and Services Statistics Database is based on a comprehensive survey of 
firms administered by Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) whereas the 
Foreign Trade Statistics Database of TurkStat is provided by the Ministry of 
Trade. The common time period covered by these two databases is the period 
2003−2015.  
At this point, it must be noted that there are heated debates on the issue that 
Turkey has entered into a spiral of premature deindustrialization during the AKP 
era both in the political and academic circles. Premature deindustrialization is 
defined as “undergoing deindustrialization much earlier than the historical norms” 
by Rodrik (2016, p3). He argues that developing countries that open up to trade 
are hit by two shocks: (i) Countries without a strong comparative advantage in 
manufacturing become net importers in this sector, reversing gains from long-
fought battles in import-substitution regimes. (ii) These countries import the 
deindustrialization of developed countries by being exposed to the downward push 
in the prevailing manufacturing prices in the world markets. Shafeaeddin (2005), 
Bogliaccini (2013) and Lopez (2017) are recent studies that link trade 
liberalization and deindustrialization in a number of developing countries. There 
are the same arguments for the Turkish economy where the deindustrialization of 
the country is dated back to the Customs Union Agreement with the EU in the 
December of 1995 (Boratav, 2016). In this paper, we explore the political economy 
of the deindustrialization process of Turkey as a complement to our productivity 
analysis.      
The main results of our analysis in the current paper are as follows: (i) Although 
labor productivity in manufacturing and services had similar movements in the 
first few years of the AKP administration (2003-2007), productivity of the services 
sector declined during the GFC with no improvements thereafter. However, the 
manufacturing sector’s productivity, which stayed stable during the GFC, started 
to rise in the post-crisis period. (ii) The productivity growth of manufacturing 
sector in Turkey has been positive yet evolving towards medium-low tech 
manufacturing which displayed the lowest productivity growth among all 
manufacturing sectors. (iii) Except Telecom and Health sectors, there have been 
productivity losses in all services sectors in the AKP era. (iv) Surviving firms in 
the Turkish manufacturing sector have increased their own productivity in the 
2003-2015 period, nonetheless there were market share reallocations to the lower 
productivity firms in this time period that pulled down the contribution of 
surviving firms to the aggregate productivity growth in this sector. (v) As opposed 
to the manufacturing, in the services sector surviving firms had a negative 
contribution to aggregate productivity growth. Even though the productivity 
growth within the services firms was positive, it was not enough to offset the 
negative impact of market reallocations to less productive firms in this sector.  
The contributions of this paper to the literature are twofold: Firstly, rather than 
working with sector aggregates to obtain the productivity figures, in this paper we 
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calculate productivity at the level of the firm and then find aggregate productivity 
at the sectoral level through weighted averages. Moreover, we work with sectoral 
price indexes (as much granular as it can) throughout the study.  
 
Table 1. Annualized Growth Rates for 2003-2015 Period (percent) 
 
L-
Growth  
VA-
Growth  
LP-Growth 
(aggregate) 
 LP-
Growth 
(granular) 
 Manufacturing + Services 
Total 8.1  4.9  -3.2   
1-19 5.5  -1.4  -6.9   
20+ 9.4  6.8  -2.6   
 Manufacturing 
Total 5.1  4.2  -0.9   
1-19 3.6  -0.5  -4.1   
20+ 5.4  4.6  -0.8  1.3 
 Services 
Total 9.8  5.2  -4.6   
1-19 6.0  -1.6  -7.6   
20+ 12.7  8.8  -3.9  -2.5 
Note: Calculations are based on TurkStat Annual Manufacturing and Services Database. 
The first three columns are calculated using aggregate data whereas the values in the last 
column come from the granular productivity analysis conducted in this paper. VA growth 
is calculated by using real values employing the producer price index (2003=100) from 
TurkStat data. 
 
Table 1 is prepared to display the differences stemming from this 
methodological change. The first three columns are calculated using aggregate 
data whereas the values in the last column come from the granular productivity 
analysis conducted in this paper.1 When aggregate figures are used in the 
productivity calculations, Table 1 shows that –even though there are nuances 
between 1-19 employee firms and 20+ employee firms- in the overall there were 
significant productivity losses in both manufacturing and services sectors in 
Turkey in the AKP era. Although both employment and value-added in Turkey 
have grown in this period, the growth in employment was more than the growth 
in value added. The last column of Table 1 reports the granular productivity 
estimates produced in this paper for 20+ firms. Accordingly, while the productivity 
of manufacturing sector has increased by 1.3 percent annually over the period 
2003-2015, that of services has declined by 2.5 percent annually in the same era. 
                                                 
1 The annualized value-added growth for the 2003-2015 period is 4.9 percent which is one 
percentage point lower than the annualized GDP growth for the same period according to TurkStat 
National Accounts data. This is due to the fact that agriculture and mining are not included in 
Table 1. 
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In other words, aggregate productivity figures underestimated the productivity 
improvements in the manufacturing sector and overestimated the productivity 
losses in the services sector.  
The importance of these results originates from the fact that policy measures 
are often put in place by capitalizing on the aggregate analysis. However, in this 
paper, we show that firms in manufacturing and services sectors are diversely 
different from each other in terms of employment and value added. In other words, 
in the existence of significant amounts of heterogeneity between manufacturing 
and services sector firms as in the case of Turkey, using aggregate productivity 
figures results in biased conclusions which leads to incorrect policy measures.  
Secondly, the analysis of the survival dynamics of manufacturing and services 
firms in terms of productivity growth at the level of the firm during the AKP era 
gives important clues about the probable results of ongoing sectoral policy 
measures in Turkey. The finding that surviving firms in the manufacturing sector 
contributing positively to the productivity growth while those in the services sector 
pulling down the productivity of the entire services sector comes with important 
policy implications. Considering that the manufacturing sector exhibits sustained 
high levels of productivity against a backdrop of deindustrialization, industrial 
policy measures aiming at expanding the relative size of this sector in Turkey are 
necessary.        
The paper is organized in seven sections. Section 2 offers a tour of the political 
landscape of the AKP relevant to this paper. We then continue with a detailed 
discussion of the nature of production under the AKP rule in Section 3 followed by 
our firm-level productivity analysis in Section 4. We first provide a description of 
the data and a brief discussion of the methodology and then we present our 
analysis of firm productivity in levels and in growth terms followed by the Melitz-
Polanec (2015) decomposition of the productivity growth. In the light of results of 
our analysis, we provide a critical evaluation of the production structure in Turkey 
in Section 5. Finally, we conclude and discuss the policy implications of the current 
granular productivity analysis in Section 6.  
 
2. An Aerial Tour of the AKP Policy Landscape 
As a newly founded political party, the AKP came to power in Turkey in the 2002 
parliamentary elections. An excellent historic evaluation of the context of this 
particular election is provided by Çarkoğlu (2007).  Our objective in this section is 
to provide the necessary background in terms of the relevant AKP economic 
policies to put the developments in manufacturing and services sectors as well as 
firm productivity into perspective during the AKP rule in Turkey. We constrain 
our discussion to 2003-3015 period to be in line with the data used in this paper.  
From a political economy standpoint, the main ingredient of the AKP’s rise to 
center-stage in Turkey is the dual economic and political crises in November 2000 
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and February 2001 while following an exchange-rate based disinflation program 
overseen by the IMF. The cost of these severe crises was borne by the coalition 
partners of 1990s in terms of their obliteration from the political landscape. The 
winner of the circumstances was the young AKP, which was indeed a broad 
coalition of different layers of Turkish society in those days.     
The era put under microscope in this paper is important in the sense that it 
represents the second phase of the neo-liberal restructuring of the Turkish 
economy. The first phase -based on the Washington Consensus- was introduced in 
1980s and included massive yet premature strides of liberalization, deregulation 
and privatization. Without the necessary legal and institutional counterpart, this 
phase resulted in a fragile development pattern that heavily depended on short-
term capital inflows (Bakır, 2009; Öniş, 2009). Mixed with clientelism deeply 
embedded in the Turkish financial system, the first phase was the perfect recipe 
for the makings of the three successive crises in 1994, 2000 and 2001. The second 
phase that evolved in a Post-Washington Consensus environment has coincided 
with the AKP rule and required moving beyond the obsession of short-term 
macroeconomic discipline with no regard to its societal costs. Essentially, the new 
type of conditionality in the second phase zeroed in on the regulatory role of state.          
In what comes next, we examine the AKP rule in the Post-Washington 
consensus era by dividing it into three different periods: 2003-2006/2007, 2008-
2010 and 2011-2015. These periods were carefully chosen to reflect the significant 
differences in policy measures taken and their economic outcomes.    
 
2.1. Loyalty to Reforms (2003-2006/2007) 
In the history of neo-liberal restructuring of the Turkish economy, there is no 
scarcity of political authorities that have been forced to implement a number of 
reforms in the aftermath of an economic crisis that inadvertently limited their 
range of movement. In other words, in the crisis times, political elites had to 
voluntarily limit their activities in terms of resource allocation in the country. In 
this context, the AKP government was no different. Their difference stemmed from 
standing behind most of the reform decisions taken by a previous government and 
the EU membership anchor, which in turn paved the way to give confidence to the 
international community in terms of the AKP’s management of the economy. 
The foundations of the economic reign of the AKP were built on the “Transition 
to Strong Economy Program” under the guidance of the IMF. This was a reform 
package which was brought into force in April 2001 and targeted fighting inflation 
under a floating exchange rate regime, a speedy and extensive restructuring of the 
banking sector, strengthening the balance of public finances, implementing 
incomes policy and establishing the legal framework for the structural measures 
that would ensure effective, flexible and transparent implementation of these 
policies. 
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In accordance with these targets, the AKP made a number of policy changes 
that might have directly affected the sectoral composition of economic activity and 
productivity in Turkey. In this context, a broad-brush view of the initial years of 
the AKP shows the following: (i) There were improvements in the legal and 
regulatory infrastructure. The Central Bank became independent. The Banking 
Law had a major overhaul. Some of the discretionary powers of the government 
were delegated to independent regulatory authorities such as the Banking 
Regulation and Supervision Agency. The Public Procurement Law was changed in 
an attempt to harmonize with the EU Acquis. (ii) There were arrangements to 
strengthen public finances. Many agricultural support mechanisms were 
eliminated and replaced with the Direct Incomes Support Program. Private sector 
was given a pivotal role in resource allocation and production through the 
proliferation of privatization. Indeed, compared to the 4.6 billion USD equivalent 
of privatization between 1985 and 1997, privatization receipts were around 8.2 
billion USD in 2005 and 8.1 billion USD in 2006 (Yağcı, 2017). Furthermore, the 
social security reform of 2006 was a step towards reducing public debt by 
increasing the average pension contribution period from 7000 to 9000 days. The 
new system has also combined divergent practices in social security rights. (iii) 
There were new incomes policy implementations. Free market mechanisms were 
introduced to achieve step-by-step elimination of regulatory measures related to 
labor force and agriculture. A completely different set of measures were adapted 
to deal with “poverty” created by these eliminations such as in-kind and cash 
transfers by local governments (Yentürk, 2013). 
In summary, the AKP was mostly loyal to the major objectives of the IMF 
Program in the first years of its reign. However, for this paper’s sake, it is 
important to take a detailed look at the changes in the industrial policy along with 
measures taken in regards to construction/real estate sectors.  
Historically, the Turkish industrial policy was a blend of trade protection (until 
1980 trade liberalization) and subsidies to private sector investments or exports 
(especially after post-1980 export-oriented growth period). Among the primary 
tools were export tax rebates, subsidized credits, cash grants for investments, 
investment deductions from corporate tax-base and other types of tax exemptions.  
The initial approach of the AKP to industrial policy was regional prioritization. 
Through a new piece of legislation in 2004 (Law No.5084) newly created firms in 
the 36 priority provinces were offered allocation of Treasury land free of charge if 
they employ at least 10 workers for at least 5 years, 80 to 100 percent exemption 
from personal income taxes, exemption from social security contributions by 
employers, and a subsidy of 20 percent on the electricity bill. Later, with Law 
No.5350 passed in 2005, the number of priority provinces were increased to 49 and 
in order to benefit from the subsidies offered the newly established firms had to 
have at least 30 employees (Atiyas and Bakış, 2015). 
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The AKP has also initiated several programs in 2005 via the Scientific and 
Technological Research Council (TÜBİTAK) and Undersecretariat of Foreign 
Trade (DTM) to improve the international competitiveness of manufacturing firms 
through higher R&D and innovation. According to Atiyas and Bakış (2015) the 
program’s spending has increased from 81 million USD in 2004 to 357 million USD 
in 2009 and the number of project applications has risen from 360 in 2004 to 1,500 
in 2009. The R&D projects were supported in the areas of machinery and 
manufacturing technologies, electrical and electronics and information 
technologies, materials, metallurgical and chemical technologies, along with 
biotechnology, agriculture, environmental and food technologies (Tandoğan and 
Pamukçu, 2011).  
In the construction sector, one of the main policy changes during the first years 
of the AKP government was the complete overhaul of the urban development 
legislation. The government was offering a solution to the problem of housing 
provision by turning itself into a direct provider in the market (Ozdemir, 2011). 
Several amendments to the Mass Housing Law were made. The Mass Housing 
Administration (TOKI) was restructured and became one of the major players in 
the construction and real estate sectors in Turkey. In the overall, the AKP 
government has administered countrywide housing construction and urban 
regeneration projects via TOKI, the municipalities and a state-owned real estate 
investment company, Emlak Konut REIT (Erol, 2019).  
Meanwhile, the abundance of global liquidity in early 2000s and the 
strengthening of public finance after the 2001 crisis reduced the lending 
opportunities of banks in Turkey to private sector and the government, 
respectively. This contraction caused the banks to turn their gaze onto the 
consumers, which was the beginning of an unprecedented consumer credit 
explosion particularly in the middle- and upper-income households given the 
relatively stable macroeconomic environment and low interest rates. Following 
these developments and conforming to its urban restructuring design, the AKP 
government moved to enact the Housing Finance Law (No.5582) in 2007 which 
made long-term fixed-rate borrowing possible for the first time in the country’s 
history. Simultaneously, the Capital Markets Law, Law of Foreclosure, Consumer 
Protection Law, Financial Leasing Law, Mass Housing Law and tax laws were all 
changed to accommodate.  
Notice that these policy shifts happened in an environment of global liquidity 
excess which was highly favorable for growth. All emerging countries benefited 
from the post-2000 global conditions, however, Turkey enjoyed a better run than 
many others given its restructured financial system and the social net created to 
protect the different classes of the society that were supposedly hurt by the 
reforms. Furthermore, the European Commission started Turkey’s accession 
negotiations in 2005. Even though the relationship between the EU Block and 
Turkey has been nothing but rocky, the AKP government started taking large 
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strides in harmonizing the laws and regulations of the country with the EU 
Acquis. This was particularly important for the development of the institutional 
structure of the manufacturing sector in Turkey.  
Even though Turkey had a great run in terms of growth performance (7.8 
percent annually) in 2003-2006 period, two major macroeconomic problems 
relevant to the topic of this paper have not been resolved: high current account 
deficits and high unemployment rates. 
 
2.2. Global Tremors (2008-2010)  
While the to-do list of the IMF Program included commitments such as enacting 
of the Public Procurement Law in 2002 and the Social Security Law in 2005, by 
2007 what was left to do did not include any major innovations and structural 
transformations. Therefore, although the IMF Program ended on paper in 2008, 
as a recipe for economic policy it effectively ended in 2006. 
Concurrently, the GFC of 2008, fueled by a lack of oversight in financial 
markets followed by the subprime mortgage crisis in the US, has hard-hit the 
world (Bernanke, 2013). Turkey has felt the effects of the GFC most severely in 
the period between 2008 and 2009. So much so that, the Turkish economy 
contracted by 4.7 percent in 2009. The political cost for the AKP was a significant 
loss of votes in the next local elections. The policy response of the AKP government 
to this major contraction was to boost the demand by increasing government 
spending by one percent of the national income. These expenditures may not have 
been directed to the places where they would be the most productive, nevertheless 
they made the Turkish economy circumvent an even longer and deeper economic 
downturn during this period.  
In terms of industrial policy design between 2008-2010, the government 
launched a new incentive system in 2009 that reintroduced the sectoral selectivity 
of the 1980s. What is more, the 2009 incentives regime was designed to 
differentiate across regions, sectors and size of investments. First, the provinces 
were classified with respect to their socio-economic development. Next, the priority 
sectors in these regions were identified according to the factor endowments of 
these regions. Finally, large scale investments over minimum specific thresholds 
in these specific sectors also became eligible for incentives. In sum, a much more 
complicated industrial incentives regime was put in place.  
 
2.3. Surrender to Construction (2011-2015) 
Turkey entered the 2011-2015 period with the lowest levels of interest rates in the 
world since the World War II. The country has used the cheap financial resources 
that became available in this period largely for infrastructure investments and 
financing of consumption. Due to an overvalued Turkish Lira and a low interest 
rate policy in this period along with a manufacturing sector that became more 
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import dependent by the day, relative prices deteriorated against manufacturing. 
This in turn has caused manufacturing to lose its appeal and increased the 
attractiveness of the services sectors such as construction. In other words, 
Turkey's excessive use of foreign financial resources has transformed the sectoral 
preferences of the country and made the construction the new engine of growth. 
Not much has happened on the industrial policy front between 2011-2015. The 
incentives regime was changed one more time in 2012 (Law No.3305) to introduce 
the element of strategic investments. Eligible sectors were the ones with high 
import-dependency (imports account for more than 50 percent of domestic 
demand). Atiyas and Bakış (2015) present an informative summary of the new 
regime which divided Turkey into six regions, reduced the minimum investment 
thresholds for the large scale investment incentives and introduced the concept of 
priority investments in certain sectors. Furthermore, the package also provided 
incentives that promoted investments in organized industrial districts.  
However, in the 2011-2015 period, there were a plethora of policy changes 
related to construction and real estate development. Among which a few deserve 
to be mentioned here. Firstly, the AKP’s solution to the long-withstanding problem 
of “gecekondu” housing (illegal buildings on the outskirts of the cities started after 
the mass rural migrations in 1950s) was the concept of “urban transformation”. 
As discussed in great detail in Erol (2019), the parliament passed the Urban 
Transformation Law (No. 6306) in 2012 to enable the countrywide implementation 
of urban regeneration projects. Under this law, urban transformation projects 
were delegated not only to TOKI but also to local governments and private-sector 
developers. Secondly, the AKP administration introduced an essential legislative 
reform (Law No. 6306 and Law No. 2644) in 2012 to be in line with the EU Acquis 
that substantially lessened foreign investment restrictions in property markets in 
Turkey. Thirdly, the government started taking counter-cyclical measures to boost 
housing demand. Fourthly, there were mega-projects in Istanbul, such as the third 
bridge, the third airport, Canal Istanbul and the city’s financial center. Finally, 
the Public Procurement Law was changed a record 32 times from 2003 to 2014 
that resulted in 135 article changes according to the formal response of the 
Parliament dated 14/08/2014 to a written question from the main opposition party. 
While the introduction of new methods to be in line with the EU Acquis such as 
dynamic procurement system and electronic exclusion were considered to be 
positive developments, increasing numbers of exceptions created with the changes 
in the Public Procurement Law spawned questions in terms of urban rents being 
transferred between different segments of the society. 
 In short, the AKP government massively subsidized and was directly involved 
in the construction industry, which might have given the wrong message to the 
manufacturers in terms of staying and expanding in their own sector and to 
potential foreign investors to stay away from manufacturing in Turkey.  
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The aerial tour of the policy landscape provided in this section shows that the 
second phase of the neo-liberal restructuring of the Turkish economy in the post-
2001 crisis included elements of re-regulation and de-regulation (Çanakçı, 2005). 
The privilege was yet again bestowed upon the financial sector and there were no 
strong signs of shifting the focus to industrial production (Keyman and Koyuncu, 
2005). Furthermore, the industrial policy, rather than being proactive, was 
reactive to the challenges of the new-genre of globalization started in 1990s. (Öniş 
and Şenses, 2007; Atiyas and Bakış, 2015).  
In this light, the following section first provides a broad-brush view of the 
major changes in the manufacturing and services sectors in the 2003-2015 period 
to offer a more concrete contextualization of the main shifts in the development 
strategy of Turkey. Then, it goes on to highlighting the importance of productivity 
growth for the development of the Turkish economy.  
 
3. Nature of Production under the AKP Rule 
3.1. Developments in Manufacturing and Services Sectors 
One of the striking features of the 2003-2015 period was the divergent 
employment growth patterns in manufacturing and services sectors. This period 
was marked with strong job creation; indeed, Figure 1a suggests that the job 
growth in the services sector dwarfed that in the manufacturing sector.  
 
Figure 1. Employment in Manufacturing and Services, (2003-2015, millions) 
 
Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Annual Industry and Services Statistics 
Database 
In 2003, the services sector employment (in firms with 20+ employees) was 
about half a million workers, the half of the manufacturing sector (Figure 1b). In 
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2008, employment in services sector has reached and passed that in 
manufacturing, nearly doubling it in 2015 at 5 million workers mark. 
Evaluating Figures 1a and 1b together shows that a significant share of job 
growth was realized in the services sector firms with 1-19 employees. The 
employment share of services enterprises in the non-agricultural businesses is 73 
percent while the output share of these enterprises is only 52 percent, implying 
lower labor productivity in services sector compared to manufacturing.  
Complementary to this picture, Table 2 reports the employment and population 
growth rates in the years 2005-2015. While the growth rate of non-institutional 
population was 1.8 percent in this time period, employment growth rates in 
agriculture, industry, construction and services were realized as 0.9 percent, 2.3 
percent, 5.7 percent and 4.1 percent, respectively. Here, two observations are in 
order: (i) There was employment growth in all sectors with prevalent growth in 
construction and services; (ii) Employment growth in agriculture lacked behind 
the population growth pointing to either a shift of employment from this sector to 
the others or to the unemployed status.  
In sum, the loud and clear message of this overall picture is that Turkey has 
recently been in a servicification trajectory without completing its 
industrialization.  
 
Table 2. Employment and Population Growth Rates (percent) 
Period Agriculture Industry Construction Services 
Non-
Institutional 
Population 
2005-2006 -7.2 2.9 8.7 4.8 1.7 
2006-2007 -2.3 0.9 3.2 3.1 1.7 
2007-2008 1.6 3.0 0.6 1.8 1.6 
2008-2009 2.8 -7.9 5.3 1.7 1.8 
2009-2010 7.0 10.4 9.9 3.3 1.7 
2010-2011 6.5 4.9 17.1 5.7 2.0 
2011-2012 -2.1 1.3 2.2 6.0 2.1 
2012-2013 -1.8 4.0 2.9 4.3 1.6 
2013-2014 5.1 4.2 8.2 5.6 2.5 
2014-2015 0.2 0.3 0.1 5.0 1.5 
2005-2015 0.9 2.3 5.7 4.1 1.8 
Note: Growth rates are calculated using data from TurkStat Labor Force Statistics, which is 
available after 2005 at the level of sectoral aggregates. The last row reports the annual 
growth rates for the entire period. 
 
3.1.1. Manufacturing 
Table 3 shows the manufacturing sector output shares of some selected OECD 
countries vis-à-vis Turkey in 2015. 
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Chemicals/Plastics/Pharmaceuticals sector stands as the sector with the largest 
share of the manufacturing production in Turkey. The sector’s share is similar to 
those in the other countries. 
The sector with a very high share in production compared to those in the other 
countries is Textiles/Wearing/Leather. Among selected OECD countries, the share 
of the mentioned sector can reach only 5 percent while it is 15 percent in Turkey. 
The structure of Textiles/Wearing/Leather sector is labor-intensive and low value 
added.  
The driving sector of Turkish exports has been the Automotive sector (under 
Transportation in Table 3) in the post-2002 period. The share of the sector in 
production is 10 percent lower than the other OECD countries. Technological 
decomposition of the manufacturing sector in Turkey suggests that the production 
structure with low technology has not changed during the sample period of this 
study (Table 4). Indeed, there was a slight shift from low-technology production to 
medium-low technology during the sample period. Moreover, the production of the 
manufacturing products with high-technology, which was 5.1 percent in 2003, has 
decreased to 3.8 percent in 2015. 
 
3.1.2. Services 
In this section, the value-added composition of the Turkish services sector -
covering firms with 20+ employees- is scrutinized followed by a comparative 
analysis of services output composition for the entire services sector in Turkey 
with some selected OECD countries. 
When the value-added composition of the services sector firms with 20+ 
employees in Turkey is examined, it is observed that more than 50 percent of the 
sector is composed of the traditional services (Figure 2). Namely, in 2015, while 31 
percent of the value-added in the services sector originated from distribution, 
transportation and construction constitute 15 and 14 percent, respectively.  
The distribution services (DIST) accounted for the highest share in the value-
added throughout 2003-2015 in Turkey (Figure 2). This is in line with the fact that 
in all countries, distribution services represent a large share of domestic value-
added and employment. However, there was a sustained decline in the value-
added share of distribution sector from 44 percent in 2003 to 30 percent in 2015 
marking an intertemporal shift in the services sector value-added composition in 
Turkey. Considering that distribution sector provides an important link between 
manufacturers and consumers, the efficiency and productivity of this sector is vital 
in the sense that a poorly performing distribution sector can cause misallocation 
of resources that results in a multitude of economic costs.  
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Table 3. Sectoral Output Composition of Manufacturing: Selected OECD Countries (2015, percent) 
   Developed  Developing 
 Turkey  USA Germany France Korea  Hungary Poland 
Food/Beverages/Tobacco 16.75  15.93 10.10 21.19 6.84  11.48 20.09 
Textiles/Wearing/Leather 15.18  1.51 1.31 2.12 4.78  1.56 2.45 
Wood/Paper/Printing 4.72  6.33 4.53 4.92 2.49  3.52 7.73 
Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals/Rubber 21.14  28.67 20.86 23.12 22.83  20.74 25.39 
Metals (Basic+Fabrication) 16.36  10.38 12.49 10.48 13.98  7.60 12.14 
Machinery and Equipment. 11.61  15.48 23.38 10.98 31.49  22.82 11.67 
Transportation Vehicles 10.19  17.55 22.29 17.88 16.04  28.73 12.52 
Furniture 4.05  4.16 5.04 9.31 1.55  3.56 7.63 
Source: OECD STAN Database. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Aggregates of the Manufacturing Sector by Technology Classification (percent) 
Technology 
Classification 
2003  2015 
 Firm Value 
Added 
Exports  Firm Value 
Added 
Exports 
Low 60.8 43.4 33.7  52.3 37.0 31.8 
Medium-Low 22.9 26.7 21.7  28.3 31.8 26.1 
Medium-High 14.8 24.8 43.3  18.2 27.4 40.7 
High 1.6 5.1 1.3  1.2 3.8 1.4 
Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Annual Industry and Services 
Statistics Database. Firms with 20+ employees were covered.  
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Figure 2. Value-Added by Services Sector Classification (2003 and 2015, percent) 
 Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Annual Industry and Services 
Statistics Database 
 
Turkey has experienced a boom in the construction sector in 2000s. This can 
also be observed as an increase in the value-added share of construction and 
related engineering services (CES) in the entire services sector, from 10 percent in 
2003 to 14 percent in 2015 (Figure 2). It is true that the construction sector has 
close ties with manufacturing and transportation sectors and a growing 
construction sector may signal growth in the other sectors. Moreover, this may 
also mean an increase in the demand for CES from the rest of the world 
encouraging services exports. However, the construction sector is also branded by 
low productivity and cyclical work conducted mainly by males. In a developing 
country like Turkey with very low levels of female labor force participation rate, 
the fact that one-seventh of services sector value-added is generated by the 
construction sector should be evaluated with a grain of salt.  
Turkey changed its services sector value-added composition in favor of mainly 
business services (BS). Business services sector is a truly multidimensional sector 
that involves accountancy services, advertising services, architectural and 
engineering services, legal services and computer and related services. In Turkey, 
the share of business services value-added was 8 percent in 2003 but it passed the 
10 percent mark in 2007 reaching almost 17 percent in 2015 (Figure 2). This 
increase is important for at least two reasons: (i) as one of the propellants of the 
knowledge-based economy, the sector is inherently labor-intensive and has the 
potential to create new jobs in the future; (ii) there is a globally growing need for 
technological progress and internet utilization which are essential factors that 
provide new ways of production and novel modes of supply. 
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Table 5. Sectoral Output Composition of Services: Selected OECD Countries (2015, percent)  
   Developed  Developing 
 Turkey  USA Germany France Korea  Hungary Poland 
Construction 26.51  7.4 9.77 11.15 14.20  10.56 18.13 
Distribution/Repair 23.08  14.88 15.94 16.44 16.56  20.34 24.70 
Transportation/Storage 16.66  6.11 10.70 7.84 9.92  13.13 13.21 
Hotels/Restaurants 6.83  4.87 2.97 4.21 6.82  4.43 2.30 
Publishing 0.94  6.82 2.16 2.17 1.86  2.24 1.67 
Telecom 3.94  - 2.21 2.26 3.24  2.59 2.39 
IT 1.40  3.02 4.20 3.28 3.67  3.42 2.49 
Real Estate 1.12  15.75 13.49 12.60 9.70  11.03 7.77 
Professional/Science/Tech 6.03  11.72 9.73 13.30 9.17  8.67 8.16 
Administrative and Support 7.63  6.09 7.65 7.52 3.76  5.87 3.61 
Education 1.56  6.89 5.47 5.35 7.56  5.68 5.43 
Health 2.56  11.64 10.23 9.84 8.10  6.66 6.63 
Art/Entertainment/Other 1.73  5.06 5.46 4.06 5.43  5.39 3.53 
Source: OECD STAN Database. 
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The value-added share of communication services (COM) in the services sector 
of Turkey was cut in half from 2003 to 2015. This sector covers postal services, 
telecommunication services and audio-visual services. In line with the global 
trends, postal services in Turkey have undergone significant regulatory and 
technological transformations. Most importantly, owing to the recent digital 
revolution throughout the world, some of the traditional postal services became 
redundant in Turkey as well.  
Next, Table 5 shows the services sector output shares of some selected OECD 
countries vis-à-vis Turkey. As observed clearly, Turkey has the largest share in 
the construction and distribution/repair sector reaching almost 50 percent of 
services output. The same number hovers around 22 percent in the USA. 
Construction sector which employs unskilled labor has an output share of 26 
percent in Table 5 and value-added share of 14 percent in Figure 2 (20+ 
employees). This difference may stem from the low value-added of the sector 
coupled with the fact that many construction firms are small in size in Turkey. 
While the share of construction in services sector output in developed countries is 
around 10 percent, the same share has its highest value, 18 percent, in another  
emerging country, Poland. In other words, this international comparison confirms 
the above-mentioned disproportionate magnitude of the construction sector in 
Turkey.  
The total share of education and healthcare services in Turkey in 2015 is only 
5 percent. In all the other countries shown in Table 5, this total has two-digits. 
These sectors are known to be the locomotives of long-term growth performance 
for any country. Therefore, low levels of output shares in education and health are 
worrisome for the long-term performance of Turkish economy.  
Furthermore, in the framework of Industry 4.0, which is based on digital 
transformation in production, it is clear that IT and Professional-Science- 
Technical services will be the prerequisites for economic development. The output 
shares of these sectors in Turkey in comparison to other OECD countries are very 
low, nearly at the half mark. 
 
3.2. Importance of Productivity Growth Objective 
Turkey has been exposed to rampant populist cycles since 1950s that were 
initiated to establish broad electoral support. These cycles were endowed with 
constraints of short-term politics and clientelistic relations that allocated 
resources away from areas that were needed to improve competitiveness and 
income distribution in the country. 
Populism is defined as “manipulating economic outcomes in ways that 
disproportionately benefit select groups and classes, whose strength and support 
the elite relies on to maintain its rule” (Öniş 2003, p.2). Similar to its predecessors 
the AKP government has become an actor in the endemic populist cycles of Turkey. 
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However, different from the earlier governments, an authoritarian exit in the form 
of a coup d'état was not observed in the case of the AKP owing to the new cultural 
context of neo-liberal globalization. The party was acutely aware of the perils of 
one-fits-all type of single-minded free-market capitalism prescribed by the 
Washington Consensus institutions and created its own brand of neo-populism 
that was also dubbed as social neo-liberalism by Öniş (2012). This new brand of 
neo-populism has involved formal and informal redistribution mechanisms that 
made a visible difference in the lives of the poor and the middle class in Turkey. 
In other words, the AKP has concocted its own recipe of populism to transcend the 
boundaries of class politics and that has resulted in the support of broad coalitions 
from the grassroots of the society. This new brand of populism has played a major 
role in the tectonic shifts across manufacturing and services sectors in Turkey, as 
detailed in the previous section and put the economy on a steady trajectory of 
deindustrialization.  
As widely discussed in the economic growth literature nowadays (Rodrik 2016 
and the multitudes of papers referencing it), early deindustrialization has harmful 
growth effects. Firstly, as a technologically dynamic sector, manufacturing 
exhibits labor productivity convergence unlike services. Secondly, manufacturing 
has the potential to absorb significant quantities of unskilled labor. Finally, 
manufacturing produces tradeables that makes it immune to the challenges posed 
by fluctuations in domestic demand of low/middle income classes.  
Declines in manufacturing output may become inevitable for countries that 
have lower levels of technological progress in their manufacturing sectors even if 
they have productivity growth in manufacturing (Rodrik, 2016). What this implies 
is that, as a price-taker in world manufacturing markets, Turkey must sustain a 
productivity growth differential between manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
activities that is higher than the recent decline in relative prices of manufactures 
on world markets to experience growth through industrialization. 
Therefore, ongoing deindustrialization and premature servicification of Turkish 
economy presented in the previous sections is not enough to critically assess the 
sustainable growth prospects of the country. With this in mind, in the remainder 
of the paper, we dissect the Turkish manufacturing and services sectors at the 
firm-level to gain a more comprehensive understanding of recent productivity 
dynamics. 
 
4. Firm-Level Productivity Analysis  
4.1. Data and Methodology 
The data used in this paper come from the Annual Industry and Services Statistics 
and the Foreign Trade Statistics Databases of Turkey. The Annual Industry and 
Services Statistics Database is based on a comprehensive survey of firms 
encompassing agriculture, manufacturing and services sectors administered by 
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TurkStat whereas the Foreign Trade Statistics Database of TurkStat is based on 
customs declarations and provided by the Ministry of Trade. The common period 
covered by both databases is 2003−2015.  
The Annual Industry and Services Statistics survey is composed of questions on 
employment, working hours, personnel costs, social security costs, expenses, 
income, inventories, turnover, exports and imports of goods and services, 
depreciation, fixed capital investment, sales and many other firm-level variables. 
In addition, the distribution of capital as foreign, private, and government owned 
is included in the survey. The data regarding the extensive and intensive margin 
of services exports of the firms are provided by this database starting from 2006, 
whereas the data for foreign ownership start in 2008. The survey covers the 
universe of firms with over 20 employees in Turkey. In addition, a sample of firms 
-with less than 20 employees- is surveyed to compose the entire population of firms 
in Turkey.  
The Foreign Trade Statistics Database includes goods flows, the reference 
period, commodity code, partner country, statistical value (export f.o.b./import 
c.i.f.), nature of transaction and type of payment. The classification used for 
compiling Turkey’s foreign trade statistics is the Harmonized System (HS) 12-
digit. The first 8-digits are international and the last 4-digits are national. The 
data regarding the extensive and intensive margin of goods exports is from the 
Foreign Trade Statistics Database and available for the entire sample period. 
For the purposes of this paper, the two databases are merged to compose the 
universe of firms with 20+ employees in Turkey forming firm-year observations. 
The sample of firms used is composed of manufacturing and services sectors 
(excluding finance – due to unavailability). Negative values of value-added, 
output, employment are dropped. Various features of the TurkStat data used in 
this paper are presented in the Data Appendix. 
For the purposes of this paper, three different productivity measures5 are 
calculated but only labor productivity results are presented. The decision is made 
to avoid the data insufficiencies in the services sector, particularly in terms of 
capital stock. As well known, capital stock is one of the most important variables 
in the TFP estimations. The Annual Industry and Services database does not 
provide a capital stock indicator, which necessitates capital stock calculations 
                                                 
5 (i) Labor Productivity; (ii) Levinsohn-Petrin (2003); (iii) Ackerberg, Caves & Frazer (2015) (ACF). 
The TFP choice was ACF calculated with value-added, energy as proxy. The reasons for this choice 
were as follows: (1) Majority of the literature is based on value-added estimates. (2) Since the 
functional form of the production function is Cobb-Douglas, elasticities added up to 1 more often 
with value-added when energy was used as a proxy variable. (3) Estimates based on output 
involved severe outliers. Capital stock was estimated by using the Perpetual Inventory Method. In 
the productivity calculations, in line with national accounts statistics provided by TurkStat, 2-digit 
PPI values were used for manufacturing sectors while 3-digit CPI values by spending categories 
were used for services sectors. Both PPI and CPI were based in 2003 and provided by TurkStat. 
All productivity estimation results are available upon request.  
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using Perpetual Inventory Method. As highlighted in Taymaz, Voyvoda and 
Yılmaz (2008), insufficiency of investment data and the lack of initial capital stock 
in the database result in consistency problems in calculated capital stock 
variables. This problem is aggravated in services sector capital stock calculations. 
Therefore, in the rest of the study, our analysis will be carried on using labor 
productivity measured as the ratio of value added to employment. 
Following Melitz and Polanec (2015), aggregate productivity at time t as a 
share-weighted average of firm-productivity in sector j is defined as: Φ𝑡𝑗 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑗 𝜑𝑖𝑡𝑗𝑡  
where the employment shares 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑗 ≥ 0 sum to 1 and 𝑗 = {𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓, 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣}. In this study, 
the key variable of interest is the change in aggregate productivity over time (from 
t=1 to t=2) in sector j, ΔΦ𝑗 = Φ2𝑗 − Φ1𝑗.   
Labor productivity is used in logarithmic form to represent 𝜑𝑖𝑡𝑗 . Employment 
shares are used as weights, 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑗  for labor productivity. 
Melitz and Polanec (2015), henceforth MP, develop a productivity decomposition 
in order to account for the contributions of surviving, entering and exiting firms 
to aggregate productivity changes. The method is indeed an extension of the one 
developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) by the contributions of both entry and exit to 
aggregate productivity changes. The advantage of this method compared to others 
(Griliches and Regev, 1995; and Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan, 2001) is its 
success in removal of some of the biases such as the over-measurement of entry 
component and thus under-measurement of the contribution of surviving firms to 
the productivity growth.  
In the MP decomposition, survivor is defined as a firm that is present in both 
t=1 and in t=2, entrant is a firm that is not present in t=1 but comes to existence 
in t=2 and exiter is a firm that is present in t=1 but does not appear in t=2. In the 
equations below, 𝑆 represents survivor whereas 𝐸 and 𝑋 stand for entrant and 
exiter, respectively.  
MP defines aggregate productivity in each period as a function of the aggregate 
share and aggregate productivity of 𝑆, 𝐸 and 𝑋 firms: Φ1 = 𝑠𝑆1Φ𝑆1 + 𝑠𝑋1Φ𝑋1 = Φ𝑆1 + 𝑠𝑋1(Φ𝑋1 − Φ𝑆1) Φ2 = 𝑠𝑆2Φ𝑆2 + 𝑠𝐸2Φ𝐸2 = Φ𝑆2 + 𝑠𝐸2(Φ𝐸2 − Φ𝑆2) 
Then using these equations, productivity change ∆Φ is obtained and the Olley-
Pakes decomposition is applied separately to the contribution of the surviving 
firms: ∆Φ = (Φ𝑆2 − Φ𝑆1) + 𝑠𝐸2(Φ𝐸2 − Φ𝑆2) + 𝑠𝑋1(Φ𝑆1 − Φ𝑋1)          = ∆𝜑𝑆 + ∆𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑆 + 𝑠𝐸2(Φ𝐸2 − Φ𝑆2) + 𝑠𝑋1(Φ𝑆1 − Φ𝑋1) 
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The first line is a decomposition of the aggregate productivity change into 
components for survivors, entrants, and exiters. The second line applies the Olley-
Pakes decomposition to the contribution of surviving firms  to further separate it  
into two: one induced by a change in the distribution of firm productivity (∆𝜑𝑆) and 
another induced by market share reallocations (∆𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑆). The first one is the 
productivity growth within the firm over time. The second one is the productivity 
shifts across the firms in a given time. 
 
4.2. Productivity Levels 
Employment-share weighted labor productivity in manufacturing and services 
sectors in Turkey for the period 2003-2015 is presented in Figure 3.  
Labor productivity in manufacturing and services had similar movements 
between 2003-2007 (Figure 3). Thereafter, there was a marked decline in the 
productivity of services sector until 2010.  Productivity of the manufacturing 
sector; however, stayed stable during the GFC. In the post-crisis period, while the 
manufacturing sector’s productivity started to rise, there was no improvements in 
the services sector productivity.  
 
Figure 3. Productivity in Manufacturing and Services 
 Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Annual Industry and 
Services Statistics Database 
 
It is obvious that the GFC had adverse productivity effects on Turkish economy. 
As of 2015, more than 70 percent of the Turkish GDP was composed of services 
sector production, which is noticeably higher than that of medium-high income 
countries (55 percent). On the one hand, the significant decline in services sector 
productivity in Turkey magnifies the adverse effects of the crisis in the long-run. 
On the other hand, manufacturing sector productivity would have been higher if 
not for the crisis. Adding these two facts together, it is evident that the burden of 
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the crisis on Turkey is more than that was felt in the short run. As higher 
productivity translates into higher potential growth rates in the long run, both the 
composition of manufacturing and services production and the hit their 
productivity suffered during the crisis will undoubtedly decrease potential growth 
rate of the country.   
Next, to provide a more granular analysis, labor productivity in manufacturing 
and services sectors will be dissected into different layers of firm characteristics, 
i.e., employment, exporting status and foreign ownership status.  
 
4.2.1. Employment Cut  
In this paper, the size of a firm is defined in four categories: (i) small firms (20 to 
49 employees), (ii) small-medium firms (50 to 99 employees), (iii) medium-large 
firms (100 to 249 employees), (iv) large firms (250+ employees). Note that micro-
size firms (1 to 20 employees) are excluded in the dataset.  
Figure 4a shows labor productivity of firms in different sizes in the 
manufacturing sector in Turkey. As shown in the figure, all four lines move in a 
synchronized way throughout the sample period implying that the impact of 
business cycle does not change for different sized firms. However, there is a 
significant positive relation between firm size and the level of productivity in the 
manufacturing sector. There is a big gap between large firms and SMEs (less than 
250 employees). 
 
Figure 4. Labor Productivity: Employment Cut 
 Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Annual Industry and Services Statistics 
Database 
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Labor productivity of services sector firms in different sizes are displayed in 
Figures 4b. In the services sector, the same conclusions can be made about the 
firm size and labor productivity as in the manufacturing sector.  
The important observation from Figure 4 is the difference between productivity 
levels in the manufacturing and services sectors and their movement over time. 
In almost all firm-sizes, manufacturing shows higher productivity than services. 
Furthermore, productivity of manufacturing firms demonstrates a secure positive 
trend in the 2003-2015 period while the same trend is negative in services firms 
independent of their size group.  
 
4.2.2. Export Cut 
Figure 5 shows labor productivity in manufacturing and services sectors for 
exporting and non-exporting firms. While blue lines indicate non-exporting firms, 
red lines are for exporting firms. Dashed lines represent manufacturing firms and 
solid lines are for services firms.   
Figure 5 indicates that exporters are more productive in both sectors, in line 
with an extensive literature in international trade (See Bernard et al. 2007 and 
the reference therein). Productivity of exporters and non-exporters in the 
manufacturing sector of Turkey in the years 2003-2015 exhibit a similar pattern. 
On the other hand, productivity gap between services exporters and non-exporters 
widened in the post-crisis period.  
 
Figure 5. Labor Productivity, Manufacturing and Services Comparison 
 Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Annual Industry and Services 
Statistics Database and Foreign Trade Statistics Database 
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A striking result is the convergence of the labor productivity levels of 
manufacturing and services exporters in the sample period. In 2003, productivity 
of services exporters was much higher than that of manufacturing exporters. This 
gap has disappeared slowly by 2012 and thereafter the two series showed an 
upward movement together.  
 
4.2.3. Foreign Share Cut 
The foreign ownership status of a firm is defined in five categories in this paper: 
(i) domestic, (ii) up to 10 percent foreign share, (iii) 10 to 49 percent foreign share, 
(iv) 50 to 99 percent foreign share, (v) foreign firm. Note that share of domestic 
firms in the data set is almost 97 percent. 
Figures 6a and 6b show labor productivity of firms with different foreign 
ownership status in the manufacturing and services sectors in Turkey, 
respectively. Domestic firms in both sectors exhibit very low levels of productivity 
compared to firms with any type of foreign involvement. The gap is large in size 
showing the vital importance of foreign direct investment in increasing the level 
of productivity in Turkey. 
A remarkable result in Figure 6 is that both manufacturing and services firms 
experience an outstanding boost in labor productivity even with a minimal amount 
of foreign involvement. In other words, the productivity difference between 
manufacturing and services firms disappear when there is a foreign partner.  
Considering that services sector firms are far from any type of institutional 
structure in Turkey, even the tiniest foreign involvement creates a big difference 
for these firms in terms of productivity.  
 
Figure 6. Labor Productivity: Foreign Share Cut 
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Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Annual Industry and Services Statistics Database 
 
4.3. Productivity Growth and Its Components 
4.3.1. Growth in Firm Productivity 
Table 6 shows the productivity growth of manufacturing and services sectors, 
respectively. The Table provides information on weighted and unweighted labor 
productivity.  
 
Table 6. Annualized Labor Productivity Growth Rates (percent) 
 Manufacturing Services 
Period Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
2003-2007 -0.55 -2.52 -4.59 -1.74 
2008-2010 1.81 1.50 -5.49 -9.01 
2011-2015 3.87 3.64 0.87 0.75 
Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Annual Industry and Services Statistics Database 
 
Employment-weighted and unweighted labor productivity growth rates in 
manufacturing sector shown in Table 6 display similar growth rates for all time 
periods under concern. During 2003-2007 period, labor productivity growth was 
negative probably due to the change in regulations regarding the informality. In 
other words, there were waves of incentives given to the firms to reduce 
informality such as tax pardons and social security incentives. The outcome was a 
huge influx of employment both with the entrance of small informal firms and 
informal employees of medium to large firms to the system (see Table A2). During 
the GFC years, 2008-2010 period, there were slight increases in labor productivity 
growth, indicating that the crisis did not heavily affect labor productivity in 
Turkey. After the GFC, labor productivity increased more than 3.5 percent.  
Table 6 shows that services sector productivity decreased in 2003-2007 period 
due to the same reason discussed above for the manufacturing sector. In the GFC 
period of 2008-2010, productivity in the services sector displayed a significant 
decline of 9 percent. Moreover, since then, the sector has not recovered. This is in 
sharp contrast to manufacturing sector which seems to be the engine of 
productivity growth in the post-crisis years.  
The technology composition of the manufacturing sector in Turkey is not 
sophisticated. In the sample period, the change in the production technology in 
manufacturing has been from low to medium-low level of sophistication as seen in 
Table 7. However, in the same period, the share of high technology production, 
which was already the lowest among the others, declined furthermore.  
Productivity growth in the Turkish manufacturing sector increased with level 
of technological sophistication in production as observed in Table 7. For the whole 
sample period, the only exception is the medium-low tech manufacturing which 
exhibited the lowest productivity growth in Turkey. Moreover, both value-added 
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and exports of Turkey have increased in this technology sophistication class. In 
other words, the productivity growth of manufacturing sector in Turkey has been 
increasing but it was evolving towards medium-low tech manufacturing which 
displayed the lowest productivity growth among all manufacturing sectors. 
 
Table 7. Manufacturing Productivity Growth, Tech Sophistication (percent) 
Technology  
Classification 2003-2015 
 
2003  2015 
 Productivity 
Growth 
 Value 
Added 
Export  Value 
Added 
Export 
Low 1.15  43.39 33.74  37.04 31.82 
Medium-Low 0.53  26.70 21.68  31.78 26.05 
Medium-High 2.80  24.82 43.25  27.39 40.71 
High 5.82  5.10 1.33  3.79 1.42 
Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Annual Industry and Services Statistics 
Database 
 
Table 8 presents the productivity growth rates in the services sector for the 
2003-2015 period. Except Telecom and Health sectors, there have been 
productivity losses in all services sectors in this time period.  
 
Table 8. Services Sector Productivity Growth (percent) 
 Productivity 
Growth 
Share in Value-Added 
Services 
Classification 2003-2015 2003 2015 
Business Services -4.30 7.74 16.59 
Construction -1.82 10.26 13.93 
Telecom 3.99 14.57 6.53 
W&R -2.29 44.25 30.87 
Education -0.20 1.21 3.69 
Health 2.23 2.19 4.44 
Other -1.75 0.33 0.21 
Art/Recreation -0.44 0.74 0.71 
Transportation -4.83 13.37 15.18 
Travel -1.15 5.34 7.86 
Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Annual Industry and Services 
Statistics Database 
 
Among services sectors, Telecom is the one with the highest productivity 
growth. The share of the communication sector in value-added declined from 14.57 
percent in 2003 to 6.53 percent in 2015. Starting from 2000, there have been 
significant reforms taken place towards the liberalization of telecommunications 
sector in Turkey. Among these, the most important ones are the foundation of an 
independent regulatory authority, namely Telecommunications Authority; the 
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ending of the monopoly power of Turk Telecom on voice services and fixed lines; 
the privatization of Turk Telecom and the liberalization of mobile 
telecommunications by the introduction of the structural reforms toward 
increasing activity in the communications. Consequently, the communications 
sector started showing high productivity increases in Turkey. 
Health was the second among services sectors with the highest productivity 
increases for the period 2003-2015. The value-added share of health sector which 
was 2.19 percent in 2003, increased to 4.44 percent in 2015.  
In Table 8, the sector with the lowest productivity growth is shown as 
transportation. The value-added share of this sector has exhibited an increase 
from 13.37 percent in 2003 to 15.18 percent in 2015.  
The services sector with the second lowest productivity growth for the period 
2003-2015 was Business Services. Firms in this sector provide support services to 
other firms, such as consultancy, office administration, and placement of 
personnel, security services, travel arrangement, cleaning, and waste disposal.  
 
4.3.2. Decomposition of Productivity Growth 
Turkish firms exhibit a very high degree of churning in terms of entry and exit for 
the period 2003-2015 (Table 9). In particular, in the years 2005 and 2010 there 
was a huge degree of entry into the market. However, this is not based on economic 
fundamentals but rather a product of survey sampling adjustments. The exit 
rates, which ranged around 6.82-10.81 percent in the pre-crisis period, have 
increased to the range of 14.07-16.82 percent in the post-crisis years.  
 
Table 9. Entry, Exit, Survival in Firms (percent) 
Year Entry Exit Surviving 
2004 26.41 8.29 61.10 
2005 41.22 6.82 57.40 
2006 19.85 9.12 78.72 
2007 9.81 10.81 88.70 
2008 33.69 7.30 64.97 
2009 10.86 16.32 87.72 
2010 43.90 8.97 54.97 
2011 26.57 14.49 72.35 
2012 24.42 14.07 74.46 
2013 20.05 16.61 78.74 
2014 23.58 15.59 75.26 
2015 18.37 16.82 80.47 
Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Annual Industry and 
Services Statistics Database. The row sums do not add up to 100 percent 
because survivor is defined as a firm that is present in both t and in t+1, 
entrant is a firm that is not present in t but comes to existence in t+1 and an 
exiter is a firm that is present in t but does not appear in t+1.   
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Figure 7. Employment, Sales and Exports Shares of Entering, Surviving and Exiting Firms, 2004-2014 
   Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Annual Industry and Services Statistics Database. 
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Figure 7 shows some economic magnitudes related to firms that enter, exit or 
survive in the market. The first panel of Figure 7 shows how employment is 
divided between these firm types. In the 2003-2015 period, half of the employment 
in 20+ firms in Turkey can be attributed to entering and exiting firms. This finding 
may have important implications on labor productivity growth. For all we know, 
the workers may be shifting from firm to firm or get unemployed and do not have 
a stable work environment to build strong skill sets. The second and third panels 
of Figure 7 show the shares of entering, exiting and surviving firms in sales and 
exports, respectively. Our knowledge from the trade theory informs us that 
exporting firms are more productive compared to domestic ones. Surviving firms 
do have the highest share in Turkish exports in Figure 7c, which can be considered 
as suggestive evidence that survival is linked to better productivity performance. 
Table 10 displays the aggregate productivity growth decomposition of 
manufacturing and services sectors in the sample of 2003-2015. Accordingly, the 
employment weighted labor productivity has grown 16 percent in the 
manufacturing sector in the course of 13 years while it has declined 30 percent in 
the services sector.  
The results in Table 10 suggest a negative contribution of entry to productivity 
change both for manufacturing and services sectors, as entrants have a lower 
aggregate productivity growth than surviving firms. The positive signs of the 
exiting firms in both sectors indicate that the least productive firms exit the 
market and this creates an upward pull in aggregate productivity growth. 
However, the contribution of exiting firms to productivity growth is lower in 
services sector indicating that low productivity firms may still remain in the 
market.   
 
Table 10. 2003-2015 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth (percent) 
 Within Reallocation Surviving Entry Exit 𝚫𝚽𝒋 
Manufacturing 0.44 -0.09 0.34 -0.41 0.22 0.16 
Services 0.10 -0.16 -0.06 -0.30 0.06 -0.30 
Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Annual Industry and Services Statistics 
Database. 
 
An important observation from Table 10 is the very different contributions of 
surviving firms to the aggregate productivity growth in manufacturing and 
services sectors in Turkey. In the manufacturing sector, surviving firms had a very 
significant contribution (34 percent) to the aggregate productivity growth. The 
contribution of productivity growth within the firm over the years was 44 percent 
whereas the contribution of the market share reallocations across firms in the 
sector was -9 percent. In other words, surviving firms in the Turkish 
manufacturing sector have increased their own productivity in 2003-2015 period, 
nonetheless there were market share reallocations to the lower productivity firms 
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in this time period that pulled down the contribution of surviving firms’ 
productivity growth to the aggregate productivity growth in this sector.  
As opposed to the manufacturing sector, in the services sector surviving firms 
had a negative contribution (-6 percent) to aggregate productivity growth. Indeed, 
this result is in line with the evolution of productivity in services sector in this era 
in Turkey as discussed above. Even though the productivity growth within the 
firm was positive (10 percent), it was not enough to offset the negative impact of 
market reallocation to less productive firms (-16 percent) in this sector. This is in 
sharp contrast to what we observed in manufacturing sector. 
 
Figure 8. Labor Productivity Growth Decomposition 
 Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Annual Industry and Services Statistics Database. 
 
When we go one step further to examine this decomposition on a year to year 
basis as shown in Figure 8, we can identify the following: Firstly, in all the years 
illustrated in both panels of Figure 8 entry has a negative contribution to 
productivity growth while exit has the opposite, both in manufacturing and 
services sectors. Furthermore, when the gains from net entry are considered, it is 
seen that the positive effect of exit of less productive firms is not enough to offset 
the negative impact of new entrants on productivity growth. This is much more 
pronounced in the services sector. Secondly, the contribution of reallocation 
component in manufacturing is positive in most years while it is positive for 
services only for 3 years in the sample as seen in Figure 8. In other words, among 
the surviving firms market share was reallocated to less productive firms more 
often in the services sector in Turkey in the 2003-2015 period. Thirdly, the within-
firm component contributes positively to productivity growth in most of the years 
in both manufacturing and services sectors. Evaluated together these three 
findings point to a conclusion that surviving firms in both sectors contribute 
-30%
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
(a) Manufacturing
Within Reallocation
Entry Exit
Productivity Change
-30%
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
(b) Services
Within Reallocation
Entry Exit
Productivity Change
30 
 
positively to productivity growth through their within-firm productivity 
enhancements, however, misallocation of resources created by a high degree of 
entry and exit not conducive to productivity improvements (net entry has a 
negative impact) and shifts of market shares to less productive firms among the 
surviving ones limit productivity performance particularly in the services sector. 
 
5. A Critical Evaluation 
Having presented the developments in manufacturing and services sectors in the 
2003-2015 period and the results of our productivity analysis, in this section we 
attempt to provide an evaluation of our findings in the light of the AKP policy 
preferences. 
One of the most important facts in the economic history of developed countries 
is the sectoral shifts they witnessed during their development process. With the 
first and second industrial revolutions, these countries have made significant 
strides from agriculture to manufacturing followed by a shift from manufacturing 
to services within the last fifty years harboring the third and fourth industrial 
revolutions. Turkey has also experienced important transitions between the main 
sectors of its economy in the last 100 years6. As seen in Figure 9, the share of 
agriculture decreased from 33 percent to 9 percent in the period spanning 1923 to 
2015. The share of manufacturing increased from 16 percent to 19 percent in 
almost a century, whereas the share of services has increased from 50 percent to 
72 percent.  
When we concentrate on post 2000s in Figure 9, we observe that the share of 
agriculture in GDP declined from 11 percent to 9 percent. The major structural 
change in this era is the decreasing share of manufacturing sector (from 23 percent 
to 19 percent) and the increasing share of services sector (66 percent to 72 percent). 
As much as the zeitgeist of the 2000s where many developing nations experienced 
successively increasing rates of servicification in their economies, this structural 
shift has its roots in the AKP policy practices.  
One of the main reasons for the long political reign of the AKP in Turkey has 
its roots in the party’s ability to build broad alliances that drew power from the 
grass-roots of the society. The AKP government was able to implement neo-
populist policies that would appeal to both low-income and middle income groups. 
While a number of transfer policies enticed the low-income electorate, low interest 
rates and credit expansions have enabled the middle and upper-middle income 
                                                 
6 The sources and the consequences of the shift away from agriculture have been discussed in the literature 
extensively (Pamuk; 2008 and the references therein). This shift was fueled mainly by two factors: (i) the 
agricultural policy transformation from “the 1950-1980 developmentalism” to “the post-1980s globalism” and 
(ii) the reluctance of political elites to implement comprehensive reforms that might result in large electoral 
losses. Consequently, the restructuring of Turkish agriculture that emerged in the wake of dominance of 
transnational agribusiness companies has unleashed a process of de-agrarianization in post-1980s. The 
resulting migration from rural to urban areas has brought employment shifts from agriculture not to 
manufacturing but to services sector. 
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groups to realize their postponed expenditures due to unstable political and 
economic environment of 1990s. This, in turn, played a very important role in the 
victory of the AKP in the ballot-box, election after election. In other words, the 
AKP sought to realize growth by promoting non-manufacturing economic 
activities such as construction. And it worked. However, these policies had a 
supposedly uncalculated (by the government) large effect on the level and growth 
of productivity in manufacturing and services sectors. 
 
Figure 9. Share of the Sectors in GDP (1923-2015, percent) 
 
 
Note: Recent GDP series (in current prices) with base year 2009 were extended backwards by 
using the annual increases of the archived GDP (with old base years) of the CBRT website.  
 
In what follows, we present three major changes that occurred during the AKP 
reign and had an important part in the sector share shifts and firm productivity 
dynamics in Turkey in 2003-2015 period.   
 
5.1. Deteriorated Credit Structure 
Credit structure in Turkey had deteriorated to the detriment of the manufacturing 
sector. Recall from Section 2 that the abundance of global liquidity in early 2000s 
and the strengthening of public finance after the 2001 crisis reduced the domestic 
lending opportunities of banks in Turkey to private sector as well as to the 
government and resulted in an unparalleled consumer credit eruption, 
particularly the mortgages. It is not hard to see that household savings that could 
have been used to finance new investments by the manufacturers went to 
mortgages that financed residential construction which does not contribute to 
productive capacity. Furthermore, when the interest rates on new housing loans 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1
9
2
3
1
9
2
6
1
9
2
9
1
9
3
2
1
9
3
5
1
9
3
8
1
9
4
1
1
9
4
4
1
9
4
7
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
3
1
9
5
6
1
9
5
9
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
5
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
7
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
3
agriculture manufacturing services
32 
 
in Turkey are scrutinized, it is seen that there was a major decline from 25.2 
percent in 2004 to 9.7 percent in 2013 (Erol, 2019). As a result, total residential 
mortgage debt has surged from 361.6 million USD in 2003 to 49.4 billion USD in 
2015, demonstrating an astonishing increase of 13,662 percent (Figure 10). 
Even under these circumstances, Turkish manufacturing experienced positive 
growth in its labor productivity as shown in Section 5, which might have been 
much higher if manufacturing were a policy priority.     
 
Figure 10. Development of Mortgages, 2003-2015 
 
Note: Authors’ own calculation using Turkey Banks Association (TBB) data. 
 
5.2. Crowding-Out of Manufacturing 
The obvious policy preference of the AKP government in favor of construction 
sector in 2003-2015 period (as detailed in Section 2) caused the crowding-out of 
manufacturing activities through an almost doubling of the size of construction 
from 4.6 percent in 2003 to 8.2 percent of GDP in 2015. More importantly though, 
the construction sector has metamorphosed in this time period.      
The construction sector is classified under three main headings in NACE: (i) 
Construction of buildings (development of building projects, construction of 
residential and non-residential buildings); (ii) Civil engineering construction 
(constructions of roads, railways, bridges, tunnels and utility projects) and (iii) 
Specialized construction activities (demolition, site preparation, electrical, 
plumping, sewerage activities etc.)  
Tables 11 and 12 show the evolution of the construction sector in terms of sector 
composition and growth of components in 2003-2015 period. The share of 
construction of buildings increased from 50.3 percent in 2003 to 57.2 percent in 
2015 with even higher values in-between years. This sector also includes airport 
and hospital construction projects, which were carried out mostly through public-
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private partnership programs during the AKP era. Furthermore, while the share 
of civil engineering construction (undertaken mostly through the public-sector and 
have a significant part in the infrastructure) stayed relatively stable around 25 
percent, that of specialized construction activities (mostly labor intensive) declined 
from 25.4 percent in 2003 to 16.1 percent in 2015 (Table 11). 
 
Table 11. Production Shares in the Total (percent) 
NACE Construction 2003 2007 2011 2015 
41 Construction of buildings 50.3 61.7 58.1 57.2 
42 Civil engineering construction 24.3 22.7 25.5 26.7 
43 Specialized construction activities 25.4 15.6 16.5 16.1 
Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Annual Industry and Services Statistics 
Database. 
 
Table 12. Annualized Growth in Real Production (percent) 
NACE Construction 2003-2007 2008-2010 2011-2015 
41 Construction of buildings 32.1 7.5 17.2 
42 Civil engineering construction 23.4 12.3 15.5 
43 Specialized construction activities 11.1 10.3 16.9 
Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Annual Industry and Services Statistics 
Database. 
 
All sub-sectors have grown from 2003 to 2015, however, the highest growth 
rates were observed in construction of buildings (32. 1 percent) and civil 
engineering construction (23.4 percent) in 2003-2007 period (Table 12). Notice that 
even in the GFC years of 2008-2010 the construction sector continued to grow at 
record rates ranging from 7.5 to 12.3 percent.       
In sum, the sector was dominated by construction of buildings and it grew at 
record pace in 2003-2015. Figure 11 gives information about the building permits 
granted during the reign of AKP government in this period. As shown in panel (a) 
both non-residential and residential building permits were on rise, however, the 
growth of residential buildings was at a much faster pace.  
More relevantly, panel (b) shows a further breakdown for the industrial 
building permits. The number of permits showed a volatile pattern in 2003-2015 
period. What is most surprising here is the halving of the share of industrial 
building permits in non-residential buildings from 16 percent to 8 percent. This, 
in our opinion is one of the most glaring indicators of the ongoing 
deindustrialization in Turkey in the AKP era.     
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Figure 11. Building Permits Issued in 2003-2015 
 Note: Authors’ own calculation using TurkStat’s Building Permits Statistics Database. 
 
5.3. Weaknesses of Industrial Policy Design 
The industrial policy measures that were taken during the AKP era suffered from 
a plethora of deficiencies that not only hampered the potential productivity growth 
but also handicapped the advancement of the technological sophistication of 
manufacturing. 
These deficiencies are lined up in Atiyas and Bakış (2015) as follows: (i) The 
incentives policy of 2000s did not have a sectoral selectivity until 2009. (ii) The 
incentives regime was volatile in the sense that important components were 
changed very frequently that contributed to the unpredictability of the industrial 
policy. (iii) All incentives granted were published in the Official Gazette, however, 
transparency in terms of process was a problem. Most incentives were determined 
by the AKP Cabinet without much justification or public consultation. (iv) There 
was a lack of coordination. Evidently, there have been various programs for the 
same purpose with few links between them. (v) There were almost no impact 
evaluations of the granted incentives. 
All of these are contributing factors to the findings of this paper. Most relatedly, 
we found that in 2003-2015 period the productivity growth of manufacturing 
sector in Turkey has been positive yet evolving towards medium-low tech 
manufacturing which displayed the lowest productivity growth among all 
manufacturing sectors. Furthermore, surviving firms in the Turkish 
manufacturing have increased their own productivity in the 2003-2015 period, 
nonetheless there were market share reallocations to the lower productivity firms 
in this time period that pulled down the contribution of surviving firms to the  
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Figure 12. The Shares of Main Economic Activity, Targeted and Actual 
 
Note: The actual values are obtained from TurkStat National Income Statistics. The target values are from the 8th, 9th and 10th Development 
Plans of Turkey.  
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aggregate productivity growth in this sector. Finally, as opposed to the 
manufacturing, in the services sector surviving firms had a negative contribution 
to aggregate productivity growth. Even though the productivity growth within the 
services firms was positive, it was not enough to offset the negative impact of 
market reallocations to less productive firms in this sector.  
To sum up, in the post-2002 period, manufacturing has lost its quality as a fast-
growing, locomotive sector in Turkey. The policy texts of the AKP era that were 
excellently analyzed Taymaz and Voyvoda (2015) were acutely aware of 
dependence on imports, backwardness in technological sophistication, 
deindustrialization and break-up of backward/forward linkages in the country’s 
production structure. However, as shown in Figure 12, all three development plans 
of Turkey implemented in the 2003-2015 period undershot their manufacturing 
sector objectives while overshooting the services sector ones. This picture can be 
considered as the score card of the AKP in terms of its policy implementation in 
regards to the productive structure of the Turkish economy. 
 
6. Concluding Discussion and Policy Implications 
Industrialization contributing to economic growth is an irrefutable fact of the 
modern times. This is due to manufacturing’s ability to absorb low-skilled workers 
released from agriculture or petty services and due its potential to deliver 
relatively greater productivity growth in the long run. The unhalted growth in the 
developing world since the mid-1990s, however, has not been driven by this 
traditional mechanism. It was rather a product of capital inflows or commodity 
booms that begs the question of how sustainable this growth will prove to be in 
the near future.  
Propelled by this motivation, in this paper we investigated the productivity 
dynamics of Turkish economy during the AKP era to contribute to the ongoing 
discussions of long-term economic growth of the country, using a unique data set 
and firm-level granular productivity analysis. Furthermore, we scrutinized the 
deindustrialization of Turkey as a complement to our productivity analysis. 
Among a plethora of results, the following three are the most important ones in 
terms of their policy implications: (i) The aggregate productivity figures 
underestimate the productivity improvements in the manufacturing sector and 
overestimate the productivity losses in the services sector. (ii) The productivity 
growth of manufacturing sector in Turkey has been positive yet evolving towards 
medium-low tech manufacturing which displays the lowest productivity growth 
among all manufacturing sectors. (iii) While the surviving firms in the Turkish 
manufacturing sector have increased their own productivity in the AKP era, in the 
services sector surviving firms had a negative contribution to aggregate 
productivity growth. 
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At this point, let us note that the level of institutionalization in sectors such as 
construction and services in general is much lower than in manufacturing 
activities. This may create significant opportunities for politicians to mobilize 
economic resources, particularly the ones for financing infrastructure investments 
through public procurement such as urban transformation projects based on state-
municipal-private sector cooperation. The main problem with such maneuvers is 
that some of the foreign financial resources brokered by the private sector in these 
cases may quickly become excluded from parliamentary control through 
institutions (such as TOKİ in the Turkish case) whose status is not very clear. And 
this in turn can cause a crowding-out effect on the manufacturing production. 
Turkey seems to have walked this path in the 2003-2015 period as laid out in this 
paper.  
Furthermore, all the while the Turkish economy was deindustrializing, it was 
also subject to serious import competition. Rather than a much needed boost in 
the domestic production of imported intermediates, each day new genres of 
imported products were added to the production lines of the Turkish 
manufacturers. One culprit behind this failure was the inability of the 
manufacturers to muster the financial resources necessary for investing in 
efficient methods to produce imported intermediates domestically. These 
resources were long shifted to construction and other services sectors. Overall, in 
the AKP era, the growth policy was engineered in favor of services sectors which 
were not subject to much international competition for a long time. Consumption 
expenditures based on credit expansions coupled with infrastructure expenditures 
of the public sector have been among the most important sources of growth in the 
2003-2015 period in Turkey. Meanwhile, the Turkish manufacturing sector was 
still much better than its services counterpart in terms of productivity growth but 
it fell short of developing additional productive capacity to update its technological 
sophistication during this period.  
This picture implies the necessity of finding a new growth model for Turkey if 
the current trajectory of deindustrialization is allowed to continue. One venue is 
to implement a services-led growth policy. This requires a move towards services 
sectors that are highly productive and tradeable, such as information technology 
and finance. However, these types of services sectors require a skilled labor force 
and lack the potential to absorb the low-skilled workers released from agriculture 
and petty services. Another venue –the more traditional one- is to go back to the 
objective of industrialization and reap the benefits of a technologically dynamic 
sector which is branded as the engine of growth in the previous literature.  
In the light of this paper’s findings and our evaluation presented in the previous 
sections, we believe it is important to point out the policy implications while 
concluding the paper.   
First, to increase the overall productivity in Turkey, the sector that needs to be 
supported in terms of productivity enhancements is the services sector. 
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Considering the sheer size of this sector in the Turkish GDP, unless services sector 
increases its productivity, the country will not be able to experience sustainable 
high rates of productivity and hence growth. This is only possible by increasing 
the productivity of the services sector with policy measures that support such an 
objective.  
Recall that, the major structural change during the AKP era that is analyzed in 
this paper is the decreasing share of manufacturing sector (deindustrialization) 
and the increasing share of services sector (servicification). Considering that the 
manufacturing sector exhibits sustained high levels of productivity, industrial 
policy measures aiming at expanding the relative size of this sector in Turkey are 
necessary. The objectives of these measures should be lower levels of import 
dependency in production, a steady supply of qualified human capital to the sector 
through targeted education policies, and selective incentives provided to the 
carefully chosen priority industries/firms.    
Second, innovation capacity in the manufacturing sector of Turkey should be 
developed using multi-faceted policy measures that promote a better quality 
education and incentivize entrepreneurship. One such measure is designing and 
implementing an education system that cultivates problem-based learning which 
improves the critical-thinking and creativity of the human capital. Another 
measure would be supporting industry-university-entrepreneur cooperation by 
using government incentives mechanisms based on ex-ante and ex-post impact 
assessment analyses.  
Third, productivity gains in health sector have important implications for 
socially-inclusive growth in the long run. The subsidies given to this sector and 
trade incentives perhaps played a major role in this positive development. 
Therefore, similar support policies can be adapted to other services sectors that 
were afflicted by negative productivity growth rates. For example, transport sector 
with a high participation to services value-added exhibits the lowest productivity 
growth in the country. It is obvious that this will have negative growth implication 
if appropriate policy interventions are not adopted in the near future. Moreover, 
increasing the productivity of business services sector would boost the productivity 
in other sectors of Turkish economy, special attention should be given to this sector 
in order to increase its productivity.  
In addition to these more general policy implications, next, some specific 
discussions are provided regarding SMEs, trade and FDI. 
SMEs: It is a fact that most of the services sector is composed of small and 
medium size enterprises (SMEs). It is also a fact that in Turkish economy, over 
the years, SMEs have been heavily subsidized as they had limited access to 
finance. In 2003-2015 period, a messy incentives policy that was not based on solid 
productivity enhancement criteria may have helped create zombie firms (insolvent 
borrowers, Caballero et al, 2008) particularly in the services sector of Turkey.  
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The resulting policy implication is that the incentives given to SMEs in Turkey 
throughout the last decade have no significant effect on productivity levels of these 
firms. This is also evidenced in the literature that development improves the most 
if the resources are dedicated to the large firms due to large absorptive capacity of 
these firms (Jaud and Freund, 2015). 
Therefore, the incentives policy design of Turkey has to be revised to focus on 
productivity of the firms and the sectors. One method would be to direct the 
incentives to large productive firms, conditional on these firms extending support 
to SMEs in their value-chain. This way, incentives would be a mechanism to pull 
up the SME productivity with the help of large firms without creating a burden on 
them.  
Trade: In line with the heterogeneous firm literature in international trade, 
exporters are more productive in both manufacturing and services sectors in 
Turkey. Although productivity of exporters and non-exporters in the 
manufacturing sector of Turkey exhibited a similar pattern during the sample 
period, the productivity gap between services exporters and non-exporters 
widened in the post-crisis period. The immediate policy implication is to support 
services exporting both in terms of new market penetration and increasing the 
market share of existing exporters in the international market.  
More importantly, concrete measures should be taken to transform domestic 
service providers to services exporters to increase productivity of the entire sector. 
Considering the fact that majority of the services firms are small in size, policies 
to cluster the services firms to cooperate for the purpose of exporting should be 
enhanced and broadened. 
FDI: Turkey is a country that is known to have potential for foreign direct 
investment due to its locational advantage and big market size. However, the 
country’s FDI performance is much lower than its potential. Moreover, very 
different from the beginning of the sample period, currently, the half of the FDI 
inflows are in the real estate sector which has no contribution to the long-term 
growth of Turkey. 
Based on the results of the paper showing that firms with foreign involvement 
were more productive than the purely domestic ones, the obvious implication is 
adopting policy measures to attract foreign direct investment particularly in the 
services sectors. 
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Data Appendix 
Table A1 shows the nature of the firms covered in the sample. Although firms with 
20+ employees compose only 3 percent of the firm population in Turkey, their 
sales, output and value added shares are 77 percent, 82 percent and 85 percent, 
respectively.  
 
Table A1. Nature of the Firms Covered in the Sample (2015) 
By firm size Percentages 
 1-19 20+ 
#Firms 97 3 
Sales 23 77 
Output 18 82 
Value Added 15 85 
 
Table A2 provides information about the distribution of manufacturing and 
services firms on an annual basis. The number of firms with 20+ employees in 
these sectors has gone up from 15,528 to 74,853 from 2003 to 2015. In these 13 
years, the share of manufacturing firms has declined from 61 percent to 34 
percent, implying the ongoing de-industrialization process in Turkey in the last 
decade.  Note that there are significant increases in the number of firms in 2005 
and 2010 which is not based on economic fundamentals but survey-related 
adjustments.  
 
Table A2. Annual Distribution of Manufacturing and Services Firms 
Year # obs # obs-manuf # obs-serv 
2003 15,528 9,392 6,136 
2004 17,002 10,509 6,493 
2005 23,168 13,030 10,138 
2006 26,014 14,492 11,522 
2007 25,768 14,220 11,548 
2008 35,125 16,287 18,838 
2009 33,309 15,089 18,220 
2010 51,359 19,815 31,544 
2011 58,478 22,059 36,419 
2012 65,336 24,031 41,305 
2013 67,756 24,743 43,013 
2014 73,678 25,858 47,820 
2015 74,853 25,766 49,087 
Total 567,374 235,291 332,083 
 
The data exhibit a very high degree of churning of firms as shown in Table A3. 
More than one-fifth of the firms appear only once in the sample. The share of firms 
that survive for the entire sample is only 4 percent of all the firms while it 
decreases to less than 2 percent for the services sector. Less than 50 percent of the 
firms have 4+ years of life-span within the sample.  
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Table A3. Survival Dynamics in the Sample, 2003-2015 
#Years a Firm 
Appears in the 
Sample 
Manufacturing 
(percent) 
Services 
(percent) 
All 
(percent) 
1 19.85 26.92 22.50 
2 15.01 18.86 17.16 
3 11.17 12.83 12.21 
4 9.42 9.90 9.83 
5 8.15 8.08 8.48 
6 8.66 8.63 9.27 
7 3.31 2.66 2.92 
8 4.38 4.64 4.85 
9 2.38 1.37 1.84 
10 3.23 1.56 2.30 
11 4.18 1.68 2.79 
12 3.07 0.95 1.80 
13 7.17 1.84 4.05 
 
Table A4 shows the distribution of firm-year observations with 20+ employees in 
terms of their employment. Large firms compose only 6 percent of the sample. The 
rest are small and medium size enterprises (SMEs).  
 
Table A4. Distribution of Firm-Year Observations According to Employment, 
2003-2015 
Employment Cut # observations percentage 
20<emp<=50 325,510 58 
50<emp<=100 103,028 18 
100<emp<=250 70,701 13 
250<emp 35,623 6 
Total 561,861 100 
 
The sectoral distribution of the Turkish manufacturing sector is given in Table A5. 
Textiles & Apparel has the lion-share of manufacturing at 35 percent for the 2003-
2015 period. It is followed by Basic & Fabricated Metals; Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco; and Chemicals, Rubber & Plastic sectors at 15 percent, 12 percent and 
11 percent, respectively.  
Manufacturing sectors are also classified by technological sophistication in Table 
A6. An overwhelming majority of Turkish manufacturing sector operates with low 
and medium-low technology. Only 1 percent of the manufacturing sector is 
classified as high technology.  
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Table A5. Sectoral Distribution of Manufacturing, 2003-2015 
Industry Classification # observations 
(firm-year) percentage 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 24,007 12 
Textiles and Apparel 69,124 35 
Leather 5,919 3 
Chemicals, Rubber & Plastic 20,713 11 
Basic & Fabricated Metal 28,617 15 
Machinery 16,808 9 
Transport Equipment 10,470 5 
Furniture 10,983 6 
Computer, Electronics & Electrical Equip. 10,388 5 
 
Table A6. Technological Sophistication of Manufacturing, 2003-2015 
Technology 
Classification 
# observations 
(firm-year) percentage 
Low 127,693 54 
Medium-Low 62,934 27 
Medium-High 41,502 18 
High 3,162 1 
 
In Table A7, sectoral distribution of services sector is presented. In the TurkStat 
sample spanning 2003-2015 period, DIST (wholesale and retail trade) sector has 
the highest frequency of observations amounting up to 35 percent of the services 
sector. It is followed by CES and BS at 20 percent and 14 percent, respectively. 
TRSM has a 12 percent share in services sector firms.  
 
Table A7. Sectoral Distribution of Services, 2003-2015 
WTO Classification # observations 
(firm-year) percentage 
BS 47,615 14 
CES 65,822 20 
COM 2,719 1 
DIST 115,653 35 
EDU 15,231 5 
HLT 15,036 5 
OTH 2,302 1 
REC 2,053 1 
TRANS 27,174 8 
TRSM 38,477 12 
Services sector classification follows WTO as Communication (COM), 
Transportation (TRANS), Construction and Engineering Services (CES), Business 
Services (BS), Health (HLTH), Education (EDU), Distribution (DIST), Tourism 
(TRSM), Recreational Activities (REC), and Other Services (OTH) to provide a 
general frame of productivity and other features of services sectors in Turkey. 
Finance sector is not covered under Annual Industry and Services Survey.  
 
Table A8 reports the export status of firms in the sample. This includes both goods 
and services exports. While 33 percent of firms with 20+ employees engage in 
exporting, 67 percent remain as domestic firms.  Table A9 presents foreign share 
status. Almost 97 percent of Turkish firms are domestic.  
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Table A8. Export Status of Firms, 2003-2015 
Exports Cut # observations 
(firm-year) percentage 
Domestic 380,688 67 
Exporter 186,686 33 
Total 567,374 100 
 
Table A9. Foreign Share Status of Firms, 2003-2015 
Foreign Share # observations 
(firm-year) percentage 
Domestic 497,943 96.7 
0<shr<10 942 0.2 
10≤shr<50 2503 0.5 
50≤shr<100 6187 1.2 
Foreign 7209 1.4 
 
 
 
 
